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Marian Negoita 
Abstract 
This paper examines the, effect of communist regimes on post-
communist state weakness through a detailed case study of the Roma-
nian political system. The central claim is that the totalitarian, Neo-
Stalinist communist Romanian regime was responsible for the post-
communist state weakness. Through such measures as cadre rotation, 
the "blending" of state and Party structures, and planning, the Romani-
an state apparatus was transformed into a servile conveyor belt for Ni-
colae Ceau~escu's orders and ensured the hollowing-out of the state. 
This proved a major factor during the post-communist transformation, 
paving the way to post-communist patronage networks linking politi-
cians, enterprise managers, and the state. 
Introduction 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the state was perceived as a Leviathan that must be de-
stroyed to pave the way for successful economic reform. As the decade wore on, howev-
er, fresh evidence replaced these early views with a renewed appreciation for the state's 
role in economic transfonnation. As it turned out, most of the countries with disappoint-
ing economic performance also had states with weak institutional capacities. 1 Weak post-
communist states2 proved incapable to organize their economies and were unable to pre-
vent insiders from siphoning away state assets through corrupt privatization, "soft" loans 
from state banks, and other imaginative schemes. The notion that weak states were 
among the main causes of the post-communist economic crisis is today relatively uncon-
tested (Ganev, 2001) . 
In this paper, I examine the roots of post-communist state weakness in Romania. My 
central claim is that the Neo-Stalinist Romanian regime was responsible for the post-
communist state weakness. This is a somewhat counterintuitive claim since the impres-
sion left by many communist regimes was that of unified and strong state machineries. I 
show, however, that the close relationship between the Communist Party and the state 
1 For general statements, see Hellman (1998) and Frye (2002). For country-specific analyses, see 
Burawoy ( 1996), Burawoy (200 1 ), Roberts & Sherlock ( 1999), and Ganev (200 1 ). 
2 I define "post-communist state weakness" as the combination of two factors: low organizational 
coherence and incapacity to prevent incumbents from using state assets as a resource for personal 
gain. 
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apparatus led to a consistent lack of autonomy of the state vis-a-vis political power, caus-
ing widespread and resilient state capture in post-communism, when the threat of coer-
cion disappeared. 
The paper begins by presenting the genesis and evolution of the eo-Stalinist regime 
initiated by Nicolae Ceau~escu in Romania. Subsequently, I describe the attempts to 
render the state subservient to the Party. The analysis continues with a detailed descrip-
tion of the first post-communist decade, when several governments of various political 
orientations were unable to strengthen the state. In the concluding sections, I use the 
evidence from Romania to reflect on the existing scholarship on post-communist state 
weakness. 
The Neo-Stalinist Regime of Nicolae Ceau~escu 
After Stalin's death, most Eastern European regimes entered a period of moderate re-
forms and liberalization. In mid 1960s, however, communist regimes were starting to 
diverge along two routes. On the one hand, in several countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe-most notably Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, reforms continued. Other coun-
tries, including Romania and the USSR, reverted to variations on the classic Stalinist 
system. Whereas in the USSR this transition was associated with the leadership of Leonid 
Brezhnev, in Romania this trajectory was linked to Nicolae Ceau~escu, the Romanian 
Communist Party (PCR) leader whose rule began in mid-1960s and ended in 1989. 
Early in his career, Ceau~escu advanced rapidly through the ranks of the PCR lead-
ership due to his loyalty to the Party and because he was ethnically Romanian at a time 
when, during the 1940s and 50s, most of the PCR leadership was composed of non-
Romanians (Campeanu, 2002a). He became the confidant, and favorite for succession, of 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the PCR leader until 1964. Following the death of Dej in 1964, 
Ceau~escu assumed the leadership of the PCR by staging what now appears to have been 
a coup, as he apparently had fallen afoul of Dej and was no longer seen as his successor. 3 
During his first years of rule, Ceau~escu's policies were mildly liberal. He publicly 
opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet Union and its satellites. 
During these years, he promoted massive technology imports from the West and began a 
period of flirtation with the increasingly powerful stratum of scientific-technical special-
ists (Siani-Davies, 2005), in a manner reminiscent of Janos Kadar's similar policies in 
Hungary (Volgyes, 1978). Contrary to the Hungarian case, however, Ceau~escu's liberal-
ization policies were not associated with a reinterpretation of the official Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. In the famous public speech he gave in 1968 opposing the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia-one which made him wildly popular-Ceau~escu never embraced the ideolog-
ical roots of the "Prague Spring." He made it clear that the source of his opposition was 
the USSR's interference into the affairs of another communist state. These subtle nuanc-
es, however, were lost on most Romanian intellectuals and Western leaders, who quickly 
dubbed him a reformer and an anti-Soviet maverick. In the case of Western leaders, this 
label infamously survived for almost two decades, despite mounting evidence indicating 
that Ceau~escu was turning into an autocrat. 
3 At least that is what former high-ranking official Comeliu Mii.nescu later claimed (see Betea, 
_()()I). 
The beginning of the 1970s brought a change in the regime's policies. Although the 
anti-Soviet stance was maintained, political and economic liberalization were abandoned 
and Ceau~escu returned to a Stalinist strategy of legitimation through ideological indoc-
trination 0f erdery, 1991). The change of direction he imposed was not challenged, 4 and 
what followed was the advent and consolidation of a totalitarian regime. 
In the economic realm, Ceau~escu reverted to the Stalinist ideal of expanding heavy 
industry, to which he added oil processing and petrochemicals. The increase of these 
sectors was largely supported by increased quotas imposed on un-collectivized farmers 
and by cuts in consumption. This policy, however, became largely unsustainable in the 
1970s, when domestic oil production dwindled and oil imports became much more ex-
pensive. In order to sustain its policies, the Romanian government started to borrow 
money. Although the level of indebtedness was not high, nearing $11 billion in a country 
with 23 million residents, Ceau~escu nevertheless decided to pay it off quickly and thus 
maintain Romania's "independence." This proved a grave political mistake, because the 
unprecedented levels of deprivation induced by slashing consumption contributed to the 
growth of anti-regime sentiments throughout the 1980s (Siani-Davies, 2005). 
In the political arena, the maturation of the Neo-Stalinist regime increasingly came to 
mean the annihilation of most sources of opposition, within or outside the Party. 
Ceau~escu began to promote a group of young, loyal apparatchiks and used them to less-
en the influence of former high-ranking figures in the Dej regime. 5 He also directed a 
successful offensive against a smaller stratum of high-level PCR officials who were flirt-
ing with ideological reform (the quintessential representative of whom was Ion Iliescu, a 
future president of Romania). 6 By all accounts, the task of annihilating intra-party opposi-
tion was achieved by 1980.7 Gradually, the Party 's role was reduced to that of servile 
adulation of its Leader. Outside a small group of highly trusted officials, the rest of the 
Party became increasingly alienated. By 1989, the Party had practically ceased to exist. In 
his last years of rule, Ceau~escu relied heavily on the secret police, the famed Sec uri tate, 8 
and on his extended family, 9 thus turning toward an increasingly pre-modem form of 
government that Ronald Linden called "socialist patrimonialism" (Linden, 1986) and 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan later dubbed "sultanism" (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Before the 
4 Ion Iliescu, then an influential figure in the Party, recalled in one interview taken by Vladimir 
Tismaneanu that this sudden shift was not challenged because, in the eyes of many, Ceau~escu had 
been the one who initiated the liberalization in the first place: "Those from the PCR leadership 
accepted the idea that the one who made the opening was now ' turning the faucet off.' The decision 
to "tum off' thus appeared natural and was not contested" (Iliescu in Tismaneanu, 2004, p. 134.) 
5 One of Ceau~escu 's masterful moves was to issue a decree stating that the election of the PCR 
leader was to be done by the Party's Congress, not by the PCR's Executive Committee heavily 
populated by Dej stalwarts (Barladeanu in Betea, 1997, p. 203). 
~ Ceau~escu himself had promoted these reformers during the 1960s, but they were no longer useful 
for the regime. 
7 When, at the 19th Congress of PCR held in 1979, Constantin Parvulescu challenged Ceau~escu 
and his policies, no one joined him and he was silenced quickly (Iliescu in Tismaneanu, 2004) 
8 In 1978, the Department of State Security (the Securitate) gained an independent status within the 
Ministry oflnterior and became directly subordinated to Ceau~escu (Troncota, 200 I, p. 119). 
9 His wife Elena became in the 1980s the second most important person in the state. She personally 
reviewed all the promotions within the Party ranks and strictly expunged the PCR leadership of all 
but the Ceau~escu 's staunchest loyals (see Tismaneanu, 1993 ). 
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end, cntlcism was vented at the most senior levels inside the Securitate (Gallagher, 
2005). When popular rage erupted in 1989, the Securitate leaders were so apathetic to-
ward the regime that they mounted what appears in hindsight as a weak counteroffensive 
against the anti-regime uprising. 
Outside the PCR, the Ceau~escu regime skillfully silenced most potential sources of 
opposition. After his early 1970s tum towards neo-Stalinism, Ceau~escu relied ever more 
heavily on a shrewd ideology of national communism that contained fewer references to 
Marxism 10 and a considerable dose of imagery borrowed from the interwar fascist 
movement (including that of the Leader- Conducatoruf). Ceau~escu was thus able to 
capitalize on the traditionally strong nationalist sentiments of Romanians. Intellectuals, a 
social group frequently associated with opposition in the Eastern bloc, were never able to 
mount significant resistance. In all probability, the reason for this stemmed from the 
traditional weakness of left intellectuals in Romania. Thus, a legitimate ideological alter-
native could hardly be formulated against national communism from the inside. Ultimate-
ly, the fatal blow to the regime was to come from mass worker revolts in Bucharest and 
other large cities in December 1989 (Siam-Davies, 2005). 
Ifthis was the general picture of the Ceau~escu's Neo-Stalinist regime, the following 
sections represent a more systematic attempt to analyze the Communist state-its struc-
ture and operation- and its relations to the PCR. 
The Romanian Communist State 
Under the communist regime, attempts at creating a more technically competent and 
professionalized state apparatus certainly existed. These attempts reflected the rapid 
advancement of the Romanian economy toward industrial development. The National 
Conference of the PCR from 1967 adopted a set of directives "regarding the management 
and planning of the national economy according to the new phase of Romania's socialist 
development" (Holt, Bobocea, Georgescu, Anghel, & Rusu, 1968, p. 127). These direc-
tives were mainly concerned with ensuring that the best special ists were involved in 
economic policymaking. Ion Iliescu, who was later to become the President of Romania, 
and then a PCR high-level official, remembered that in 1971 he had worked with the 
Labor Minister on a law proposal for the training of state personnel. However, that pro-
posal never materialized into an actual law (Tismaneanu, 2004 ). In 1973, a new state 
entity- the Socio-Economic Organization Council-was created specifically for the 
improvement of the public administration. This state council had the mission to "study, 
experiment, extend, and generalize the modem methods of organization, periodically 
analyzing the results obtained" (Oroveanu, 1982, p. 61). The Council had the competence 
to suggest the improvement of ministries' structure and supervised the legislative pro-
posals dealing with the creation or reorganization of public administration structures. 
These preoccupations stemmed from a genuine concern for increasing the specialization 
and expertise of officials, and reflected a real trend in that direction. 
The official preoccupation for public administration reform and the perceived need 
for specialists mirrored the rapid rise in the number of specialists and experts at all levels. 
The growing number and influence of specialists and experts in decision-making were 
• F e.~le, in official propaganda the Party came to be described not as the "vanguard of the 
:- euriai.' as before, but as the "vital center of the nation" (Gabanyi, 2003, p. 84). 
matched by the rapid rise of a small segment of high-level Party officials inter 
ideological reform. Beginning in the mid-1960s, a few former high officials under ~ 
(most notably Valter Roman and Silviu Brucan), together with several officials from 
new generation promoted by Ceau~escu (notably Ion Iliescu), were starting to formu.lare 
an alternative to the official PCR line. Although still devoted to Marxism, they were 
beginning to articulate a new vision of socialism as something akin to the concept of 
postindustrial society proposed by Daniel Bell around the same time (Bell, 1973). They 
argued for a wider introduction of Western scientific and management methods in order 
to accelerate economic development and for an increased role for technical-scientific eli e 
(Siani-Davies, 2005). 
These efforts, however, were insufficient to tip the scales in favor of the technocrac . 
From the viewpoint of technical competence, the Party and Ceau~escu reverted from a 
mild "pro-experts" stance during the 1960s increasingly to a "pro-loyalist apparatchiks"' 
attitude from the early 1970s. Beginning around this time, the regime's calls for an in-
creased role for specialists were usually simple rhetorical exercises. The ideal of the 
regime, of course, would have been officials who would be good specialists but also 
trusted holders of a high "politico-ideological level" (Ceau~escu, 1982, p. 146). That 
politico-ideological skills were actually in high demand is attested by the great frequency 
of appeals toward a more "politically conscious" state apparatus. On several occasions 
Ceau~escu warned against what he called the "narrow specialization" and "tendencies 
toward technicization and functionarization" of the public administration (Ceau~escu, 
1982, p. 173). The regime's hostile attitude toward specialists was becoming visible. As 
the grip of the regime became tighter and the ruling clan ever more fearful of rebellion, 
the simple possession of sophisticated skills came increasingly to be viewed as a potential 
source of resistance. The result was the de-professionalization of the public adrninistra-
tion. 11 
In addition to distrust in technocrats, another factor working against professionaliza-
tion of the civi l service was the principle of "cadre rotation". Ceau~escu personally creat-
ed and promoted this organizational strategy. Its rationale, propaganda aside, 12 was to 
preserve the political control of functionaries. Shifting officials to and from various posi-
tions ensured that they could not develop a basis for political opposition, and the apparat-
chiki perceived that very clearly. 13 Cadre rotation affected not only the public administra-
tion, but also the Party's own organizational structure. In effect, the more important an 
organization was within the political economy of power, the more likely it was to ex peri-
11 For example, Silviu Brucan sustained that in 1985, the Ceau~escu couple went as far as gettin_ 
rid of almost all Foreign Affairs diplomats who spoke foreign languages, because apparently Elena 
Ceau~escu bel ieved that one who does not speak foreign languages could never defect to the W st 
(Brucan, 1998). 
12 Officially, cadre rotation was touted as a means to produce skilled, well-educated cadre 
could carry out activities in various domains of activity (see for example, Dragan, 1972). There ·-
nothing wrong, of course, with having "generalists" in, say, the French tradition, as long as 
nisms of training and evaluation are in place. This, however, was not the case for the eo-S · ·-
Romanian state, where Party schools mainly taught propaganda. 
13 Alexandru Barladeanu, former vice-president of the Council of Ministers, said that at the time · 
thought Ceau~escu had an "organizational rash," the tendency to invent new organiza.li 
reorganize others (Betea, 1997, p. 190). See also Brucan ( 1998). 
ence cadre rotation. For example out of eight secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee that had been appointed in 1980, only one was still occupying that position in 
I 984 (Gabanyi, 2003 , p. 167). Although cadre rotation achieved its goal in the sense that 
no organized opposition to the regime was ever able to form, 14 it also contributed to the 
de-professionalization and de-skilling of functionaries. 
The other notable feature of the Romanian public administration under Ceau~escu 
was its high degree of politicization. There were three traits that contributed to this: a) the 
control of the state by the Party from within, b) the "blending" of the Party and state 
structures, and c) the dynamics of centralized planning. Article 3 of the 1965 Constitution 
spelled out the political supremacy of the Party. The official propaganda made heavy use 
of this article to justify the control of the state from within (Holt et a!. , 1968; Cocirla, 
1980). The PCR members who worked in administration were required to report to the 
Central Committee and to local Party branches on their own activity and on the ways in 
which the administration carried out the Party's resolutions. What is more, Party leaders 
were expected to get involved in the daily activity of the administration, "helping," for 
example, to make sure that there were enough resources or devising organizational 
changes (Holt eta!., 1968). Not surprisingly, the Party exercised strict control even at the 
level of individual units. A Party publication, for example, encouraged the Party leaders 
at the level of enterprise to "maintain daily contacts with the manager, stimulating their 
initiative, helping them to alleviate difficulties" (Munca de Partid I 972: 2). What this 
meant in practice was the almost total control of operational management of enterprises 
by Party leaders. 
The natural corollary of this "close alliance" between the Party and the State was 
their "blending." Initially, following Stalin, the Romanian communist leaders maintained 
the separation between the Party and the state, seeing them as distinct entities (King, 
1978). Under the long reign of Ceau~escu, however, systematic attempts were made to 
"blend" the Party and the State. Apparently, Ceau~escu saw the separation between the 
Party and the State as an impediment to the smooth carrying out of his orders, although 
his official explanation was that he wanted to downsize what he characterized as exces-
sive bureaucracy. The regime used two strategies for blending. The first was the creation 
of bodies with double subordination- simultaneously Party and State structures. The 
previously mentioned Council of Socio-Economic Organization was only one example of 
the plethora of similar bodies created between 1970 and 1989 (among others were the 
Council on Socialist Culture and Education and the Council on State Radio and Televi-
sion Networks). The second strategy was creating offices with double accountability. For 
example, from 1967, Party first secretaries at the level of county, cities, and some villag-
es, became presidents of local parliaments, as well (Dragan, 1972). In practice, of course, 
this blending was a thinly disguised attempt at subduing state structures at both central 
and local levels. As Ceau~escu was further turning toward a path of personalized dictator-
ship, the state administration was progressively crippled. Eventually, the Party itself 
ceased to be a meaningful player in the political economy of power, as the Ceau~escus 
14 Cadres were not happy at all with being constantly "rotated." At a Party gathering in 1983, 
C~escu snapped at some Party activists who "begin to discuss whether or not to carry out a 
cenain mi sion, whether to take a position in a certain county or not!" (Gabanyi, 2003, p. 158). 
Cadres unrest must have been significant for Ceau~escu to feel compelled to issue this statement. 
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and their close allies (as Stalin before them) turned to the secret police as a means to tay 
in power (King, 1978). 
The mechanism of central planning further complicated the relationship between the 
PCR, the Romanian state, and state-owned enterprises. On paper, ministries elaborated 
planning proposals for the domain under their jurisdiction, taking into account the pro-
posals submitted by their subordinated units. The State Planning Committee synthesized 
the proposals into one document, which then was approved by the Council of Ministers, 
the Parliament, and eventually became law (Holt eta!., 1968, pp. 67-68). It is important 
to note that plans were the main instrument of public policy under communism, in eco-
nomic as well as social and political matters. 
The reality of planning, however, was utterly different from intentions. Beyond their 
political and emotional value for the regime, plan goals did not undergo a review process 
that would indicate how attainable they would be (Demekas & Khan, 1991 ). 15 Moreover, 
once they became law, plans became mandatory and no alterations were possible. In the 
frequently encountered case that something went awry and plan goals were not fulfilled, 
it was not the plans that were considered the problem, but their execution. The message 
from the center was plain: fulfill the plans, or else your position is in danger: "No excuses 
are admissible for anyone who obtains weak production levels" (Ceausescu, 1982, p. 21 ). 
As the plans' fulfillment became an issue of job security for everyone involved, and since 
the plans themselves were not negotiable, only one solution was possible: duplicity. 
The "adjusting" of statistical indicators intensified dramatically after 1980, when 
plans' fulfillment indicators were replaced with the figures that were originally used to 
create the plans (Ionete, 2003). To compensate for the difference, fictitious production 
data were added to the real data. 16 The more ambitious the plans became, the more blatant 
the deception grew. Eventually, because of the risk of public humiliation, official statis-
tics became a de facto state secret. Year after year, statistical publications became less 
numerous and thinner. Eventually, the only statistical publication left, the Yearly Statisti-
cal Handbook, shrank to a leaflet. By 1989, the Romanian economic system was a closed 
circuit of fake papers: surreal plans promptly produced fictitious results, with the official 
media uttering nary a word on the real situation of the country. Essentially, the state had 
ceased to monitor the status of its policies. 
The Romanian Neo-Stalinist state, especially in its latest moments, attained a spec-
tacular, if highly undesirable, performance. From the outside, it may have seemed that the 
state was a towering force; it was, however, a colossus with feet of clay. Arbitrary politi-
15 To be sure, propaganda claimed that plan goals were "scientifically justified" (Holt et al., 1968, 
p. 67), but this was simply not the case. Silviu Brucan remembered an interesting anecdote. His 
friend, mathematician Bereanu, was once summoned at the State Planning Committee. The presi-
dent of the Committee told him, "We know you are a world-class specialist in operational research, 
capable to find the optimal solution for the placement of new economic units. We want to build an 
aluminum plant at Slatina, that's what the comrade [Ceau~escu] decided." "Why do you need me 
then?" replied Bereanu. "To demonstrate that this decision is scientific," the answer came prompt-
ly. (Brucan, 1998, p. 143). 
16 For example in 1989, for the balancing of the plan, 10,000 thennal engines were falsely added to 
the production of three plants : Midia Navodari, Calara~i, and 23 August. This quantity, if it ever 
existed, would have been sufficient for the economy of the entire Eastern bloc for 30 years (lonete, 
2003, p. 21). 
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cal influences penetrated its decision-making at all levels. Under their pressure, capable 
functionaries either removed or abandoned their professional training to become mere 
conveyors of orders. The Neo-Stalinist state was poorly organized and mismanaged. It 
lacked a competent, assured civil service, and its capacity to monitor and analyze the 
effect of its policies was minimal. The weakness of technocracy and the great level of 
politicization of the state structures were about to prove major factors in the post-
communist transformation, paving the way to post-communist clientelism and patronage 
networks. 
The Post-Communist Romanian State 
The most important political force that rose after the bloody 1989 uprising and the subse-
quent demise of the communist regime was a small group of former nomenklatura who 
had been in disgrace during the final Ceau~escu years. ln retrospect, it could have been 
hardly otherwise. Because of the exceptionally aggressive dictatorship of Ceau~escu, no 
organized political opposition to his regime could arise. Consequently, no non-
communist political actor was visible at the time of the Revolution, and the only skilled 
politicians available were former communist officials not directly associated with 
Ceau~escu himself. 
The fundamental challenge, as it turned out, was that the revolution had destroyed 
the main pillar of a Stalinist social order, the threat of coercion (Campeanu, 2002b). Es-
sentially, the new leaders were attempting to run a command economy without access to 
direct coercion. The result was an authority crisis that led to a near societal collapse. 
Within the economy, disorganization and dramatic worker absenteeism led to a massive 
drop in productivity (Alessandrini, 1998). A former minister during the same period 
described the general atmosphere as one of "happy anarchy" (Plesu, Roman, & Stefoi, 
2002, p. 57). The new executive was also constantly flooded with requests for decisions 
in trivial matters that occupied most of their time (Roman, 1994). The new government 
had very little time for the kind of strategic thinking that might have shortened this chaot-
ic period. 
The elections of May 20, 1990, when the former communists won a comfortable 
majority of the vote, did much to alleviate the authority crisis. Ion Iliescu and the Nation-
al Salvation Front (FSN) won an impressive majority of the vote, crushingly defeating the 
opposition. The victory of the Iliescu faction initiated a period of slow and halfuearted 
economic reforms. Slow reforms served several important objectives. First, given the lack 
of a coherent reform program, "going it slow" allowed the government to develop solu-
tions as it encountered them. Secondly, a slow pace of reform served to appease the 
widespread fear of radical change of the electorate. Privatization was a case in point. 
Although a law on privatization was passed in 1991 , the results of the privatization pro-
cess were clearly disappointing. Out of the 708 large state-owned enterprises (SOE) that 
entered the government's privatization list in 1990, only two were privatized by 1993 
(Roper, 2000, p. 95). By 1995, only 8% of the large SOEs initially identified had been 
privatized (Roper, 2000, p. 97). Even when the government wanted reforms, however, 
managers of large state-owned enterprises opposed them. For example, attempts by the 
government to restructure loss-making enterprises with the help of an "isolation" pro-
gram run between 1992 and 1997-meant to design restructuring and financial recovery 
p - were largely unsuccessful. Intense lobbying by SOE managers ensured that only 
82 out the 300 largest loss-makers were included. What is more, once in the pro_ 
enterprises were able to receive more, not less, subsidies (Pop, 2005, p. 82). The po -
communist Romanian state was clearly unable to ensure the successful carrying out of 
important regulatory policies. 
Slow reforms, as it transpired, were a boon to many SOE managers in yet another 
way. The managers quickly realized that they were sitting atop an economy wholly 
owned by the state, an economy whose previously coercive controls had disappeared. 
Because of the inherited state weakness, a tacit alliance between the FSN political stra-
tum, SOE managers, and civil servants eager to get rich was not only mutually advanta-
geous but also entirely possible. And as long as reforms were slow, the theft of state 
assets could continue. The first post-communist years thus witnessed the formation and 
consolidation of patronage systems linking politicians, SOE managers, and the state. 
These patronage systems proved to be an enduring characteristic of the Romanian land-
scape. 
There was no shortage of creativity in depredating the state. Many managers of state-
owned companies entered the business world by transferring state funds to affiliated 
limited companies, bribing their superiors from iine ministries to keep them silent 
(Popescu-Birlan, 1994; Stan, 2004). Between 1990 and 1993, 721 such joint-ventures 
were registered (Pop, 2005, p. 87). State-owned banks were another preferred target for 
depredation. In some cases, politically backed state officials obtained loans at very low 
interest rates, which they then deposited in private banks with a high interest rate and 
pocketed the difference (Oprea, 2004). In many other cases, loans were never repaid. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) estimated that the propor-
tion of "non-perfomling loans" among total loans in 1997 was 57% in Romania, the 
highest number among the eight countries studied (EBRD, 1998, p. 133). When it finally 
crashed in 1999, BANCOREX (the bank that had managed all Romanian foreign trade 
before 1989) left a $2 billion hole in the Romanian budget. According to some estima-
tions, close to 90% of the loans it issued since 1992 had been non-performing loans (Cer-
nat, 2004). 17 
Amid this msh for the state coffers, strengthening the state could have hardly been a 
priority. Attempts to increase the technical competence of civil servants, decrease the 
intmsion of politics into administration, and establish fruitful connections with civil soci-
ety were feeble and largely unsuccessful. Increasingly irritated by the slow pace of 
change and the resistance posed by former apparatchiks, the Petre Roman government 
initiated Law 30/ 15 September 1990 that specified the mandate of "hiring on the basis of 
competence" (Severin, 1995). According to this law, the hiring of personnel into state 
institutions was to be made only by competition between several candidates. The same 
law specified that, upon three months of the law's approval, all state employees were to 
be "attested" through examinations. But this law was never thoroughly applied because 
many institutions in oked the principle of autonomy, previously formulated by the gov-
ernment, to resist change (Severin, 1995). Although there were discussions on regulating 
the status of public functionaries as early as 1991, these discussions never occupied the 
center stage of public debates. The Romanian Constitution approved in 1991 also con-
17 To be sure, asset stripping was not the only cause of non-performing loans. A sizable portion of 
these loans were used for the maintenance of large, loss-making SOEs. 
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tained some scattered references to the civil service and public employment. However, 
the Romanian administrative apparatus remained largely unreformed throughout this 
period. Perpetuating the Neo-Stalinist model, there was no clear demarcation line be-
tween administration and politics, and ministers could simply continue to hire and fire 
personnel in a discretionary manner (Ionascu, 2006). 
By 1996, the political balance of forces began to tilt for the first time towards the 
anti-communist opposition. Three "historic" parties (remnants of parties from the inter-
war period), together with a large number of other parties and civic organizations, formed 
an electoral alliance known as the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) comprising 
18 organizational members. In what constituted a landmark victory, both the CDR and its 
presidential candidate Emil Constantinescu won the 1996 elections and formed a new 
government. 
The new regime initiated a series of radical measures. At the end of January 1997-
only weeks after its approval by the Parliament-the Ciorbea government announced the 
decision to completely liberalize energy and food prices and the intention to reduce the 
budget deficit to 4.5% of GOP (Gallagher, 2005, p. 152). In April, after consultations 
with International Monetary Fund and World Bank representatives, the government des-
ignated for closure 10 of the most unprofitable state enterprises 18 and promised to privat-
ize about fifty state enterprises per week. In January 1997, President Constantinescu 
announced a full-scale offensive against corruption. He publicly announced the creation 
of a National Council of Action against Corruption and Organized Crime that was meant 
to sanitize Romanian public life. Although in retrospect many of its monetarist policies 
appear highly problematic, at least it seemed that the new government was willing to 
recognize and combat the effects of a history of politicization, clientelism, and inefficien-
cy. 
After the initial push, however, the new regime began to slip back into many of the 
habits of previous regimes, to which it added its own unsavory practices. The official 
rhetoric on drafting 15,000 specialists, which had been heavily used during the electoral 
campaign, was soon dropped as coalition partners began to fight over positions in the 
state apparatus. The historic parties were also flooded with requests for membership from 
former PDSR (former FSN) supporters. As a consequence, many patronage networks 
simply transgressed from the old regime over to the new one. There is also strong evi-
dence that the leaderships of the historic parties were unwilling to promote technocrats, 
preferring instead political appointees. 19 The Presidency tried to curb the widespread 
tendency for politicization, but with little success. In 1998, Constantinescu used his influ-
ence to obtain the appointment of three known technocrats as ministers. Faced with hos-
tility from coalition members, none was still working in the government one year later. 
A series of scandals that erupted in 1998 and 1999 involving high-level officials 
showed that corruption had become the norm in the center-right administration. The most 
18 The determination with which the Ciorbea government initially pursued its strategy is shown by 
the way in which it handled the reform of the mining sector. Considered among the most underper-
forming sectors, the state mining sector's workforce was halved between 1997 and 1998 (Gal-
lagher, 2005, p. 200). Although miners were offered generous severance allowances, this measure 
severely affected local economies and Jed to massive social unrest in 1999. 
19 For example, the printed media reacted vehemently at the news that loan Mure~an, an electronics 
engineer, had been appointed Minister of Agriculture (Fionta, 2003) . 
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embarrassing of these scandals was the discovery of a cigarette smuggling operation 
conducted by a high-level officer in charge of the President's security apparatus (Gal-
lagher, 2005 , p. 173). "Special" interests had become so powerful that they could suc-
cessfully challenge decisions made at the highest levels. For example, Trita Fiinitii, a 
senator who enriched himself in the grain exporting business, was apparently able to 
block a prime-millisterial executive order that would have created a state agency charged 
with supervising the privatization of state farms (Weiner, 2001 ). 
Thus, despite initial enthusiasm and optimism, the center-right government failed to 
restructure the Romanian political life. The relationship between politics and the state 
continued to be marked by clientelism, interference, and patronage. It was becoming 
increasingly obvious that sheer "political will" could not, by itself, solve the deep eco-
nomic and political problems of post-communist Romania. 
The Roots of Post-Communist State Weakness 
To some observers (Ganev, 2001), post-communist state weakness appeared to be entire-
ly the product of the post-communist era. In this paper I challenged this assumption. If 
the Romanian case is any indication, the relationship between the communist party and 
the state apparatus had weakened the state long before the fall of the communist regime. 
Our evidence indicated that far from a well-functioning machine, the pre-1990 Romanian 
state was a dysfunctional bureaucratic apparatus which had been brought to its knees by 
the Neo-Stalinist regime. Although intense industrialization efforts during the first post-
war decades signaled the necessity of an efficient and professionalized administration, the 
tum towards Neo-Stalinism effectively annihilated the possibility of state reform in Ro-
mania. Such measures as cadre rotation, the blending of state and Party structures, and 
central planning transformed the Romanian state apparatus into a servile conveyor belt 
for Ceau~escu ' s orders and ensured the hollowing-out of the state. With the state admin-
istration effectively undermined, by the end of the communist regime the only force hold-
ing the system together was the naked threat of coercion. And when the Communist Party 
dissolved, thus effectively eliminating the threat of coercion, all that remained was an 
undersized and largely incompetent state apparatus, whose civil servants were used to 
follow orders rather than apply professional knowledge. Analyzed through this lens, the 
factors that the current literature invoked as causes of post-communist state weakness-
the continued presence of communist politicians in power (Ganev, 2001) or the "shock 
therapy" which dismantled the economy (Burawoy, 1996)- appear to be rather symp-
toms, at least in the Romanian case. Given the lack of alternative voices within or outside 
the PCR, it was hardly surprising that the only politicians who had the skills to take the 
reins of power in post-communist Roma1;1ia were former communist politicians with 
some distant reputation for anti-Ceau~escu opposition. But this does not necessarily mean 
that the maintenance of former communists in power was a cause of post-communist 
weakness. Given the available facts, we can assume that the Romanian post-communist 
state would have been vulnerable regardless who took the power in 1990. Without a 
coherent and professionalized state machinery, no amount of good intentions by former 
communists, former dissidents, or whomever, could have averted the post-communist 
trajectory. 
Similarly, the depredation of state assets after 1989 was possible not simply because 
the new rulers were former communists. When the Neo-Stalinist threat of coercion was 
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lifted, it was immediately visible that the incessant attempts by the Ceau~escu regime to 
control the state had been very successful. The low level of organizational cohesiveness, 
the lack of technocratic expertise, and the ingrained habit of political subservience made 
it very likely that the post-communist state would be vulnerable to corruption and theft. 
The unsuccessful anti-corruption efforts attempted after 1996 by the center-right regime 
were eloquent proof that the political orientation of the rulers was largely inconsequen-
tial. The evidence presented here strongly suggests that although the results of the first 
post-communist elections were correlated with post-communist state weakness, this cor-
relation should not be taken to mean causation. In the Romanian case, both these phe-
nomena had been the result of the Neo-Stalinist political regime prior to the revolution of 
1989. 
A cursory examination of the evidence available on other post-communist countries 
seems to confirm the findings of this study. In many of the countries experiencing post-
communist state weakness, the state was already showing signs of weakness before the 
breakup of the communist regime. This weakness seems to have been associated with the 
degree of Party-state blending during communism. Russia is a case in point. We know 
that by the time Gorbachev left power, the Russian state system was already in a deep 
crisis. During the long reign of Brezhnev-who stubbornly resisted reforms-the symbi-
osis between the party and the state became ossified into the well-known nomenklatura 
system (Garcelon, 1997). Subsequently, the gradual decentralization initiated by Gorba-
chev had the same effect as the sudden breakup of the regime in Romania : after a period 
of disorientation and chaos, enterprise managers won the power to steal state assets while 
state agencies used their control rights to obtain bribes (Roberts & Sherlock, 1999, p. 
484). In effect, it is somewhat inaccurate to say. that the shock therapy Boris Yeltsin initi-
ated was the main cause of the post-communist Russian debacle . It appears that shock 
therapy was an attempt-admittedly desperate and grossly inadequate- to redress the 
Russian state's rapidly diminishing legitimacy (Roberts & Sherlock, 1999). The Russian 
reformers were trying to use mass privatization in a desperate attempt to strengthen the 
state. 
Nor was the Russian scenario unique. Because of the long supremacy exercised from 
Moscow, the separation of many former Soviet republics from the USSR meant that 
along with the problems inherited from the Soviet system, their monumental new chal-
lenge was to build many state structures from scratch- a task for which many of them 
were unprepared. Over these countries, not state weakness but utter state failure often 
loomed. Indeed, some of these states, such as Georgia, were so feeble that small-scale 
demonstrations could topple entire regimes (Way & Levitsky, 2006). Other governments, 
such as those of Belarus, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, were more stable because they 
maintained a quasi-totalitarian grip on society and opposed market reforms (Pomfret, 
2001; Walder, 2003). Lastly, some of these republics- such as Azerbaijan and Kazakh-
stan- turned toward a trajectory somewhat similar to Romania's by adopting moderate 
market reforms but proving incapable to prevent the emergence of crony capitalisms 
(Pomfret, 2001; Bayulgen, 2005). This cursory look across the board thus confirms that 
state weakness was already present when the breakup of communist regimes took place. 
In retrospect, it is hard to imagine how a successful transition could have taken place 
without professional and competent state administrations. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that post-communist state weakness was linked to successful 
attempts by communist parties to subdue the state in order to ensure its subservience to 
parties' goals . In addition, a summary analysis of several post-communist cases suggests 
that state weakness was generally not a post-communist creation. The common factor 
present in both Russia and other cases of post-communist state weakness seems to be the 
limited autonomy of states from the influence of communist parties. In their desire to 
control policy making, communist parties preferred loyal bureaucrats over specialists, 
discouraged coordination between various parts of the state apparatus- which prevented 
the emergence of esprit de corps-and generally rejected attempts to develop profession-
al and efficient bureaucracies. Therefore, when the communist regimes were gone, these 
states ' capacity to reject corruption was very low, regardless which parties and ideologies 
were now in power. It would matter little whether the regimes were run by neoliberals 
under Yeltsin or neo-communists under Iliescu- the result was likely to be the same. 
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